Alex Borg is invoking the defunct model of United Kingdom-style fixed-term elections. On the surface, the idea that election dates should be known from the start of a legislature sounds tidy, even reassuringto him. But beneath that neat packaging lies a proposal that is far less transformative, and far more problematic, than it appears.

The UK briefly had fixed-term elections under the fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which set general elections at regular five-year intervals. However, this system ran into serious problems, especially during political crises, because it made it harder to call elections when Parliament was deadlocked.

As a result, after receiving wide criticism, the law was repealed  in 2022 through the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022. This restored the previous system, where the Prime Minister can request an early election, and there is no strictly fixed election date (though there is still a maximum term limit).

The old system in the UK did not deliver the stability its advocates promised. Instead, it contributed to political paralysis during moments of crisis, most notably during the Brexit deadlock.

As the UK abandoned the system, this restored greater flexibility to call elections when political realities demand it. That context is conspicuously absent from Borg’s pitch.

Borg presents fixed election dates as a cure for “political tension” and “uncertainty.” But this diagnosis is questionable. Political uncertainty in Malta, or in any democracy, is rarely driven by the technical timing of elections. It stems from governance failures, lack of trust, and policy inconsistency. Fixing the date of an election does little to address those deeper issues. In fact, it risks creating more problems than none.

There is also a contradiction at the heart of Borg’s argument. He criticises the current government for allegedly operating “day by day,” yet proposes a system that could lock the country into a rigid electoral timetable regardless of changing circumstances. What happens in the event of a national crisis, economic shock, or loss of parliamentary confidence? A fixed-term system can limit the democratic mechanism of returning to the electorate when it is most necessary.

Moreover, economic actors are influenced far more by fiscal policy, regulatory clarity, and global conditions than by knowing the precise date of the next election years in advance. The idea that a fixed electoral calendar would meaningfully reduce economic anxiety feels overstated if not politically convenient, most especially when the economy is thriving no matter what.

To add insult to injury Borg mentioned that election dates that aren’t fixed cause anxiety among those couples who are about to get married for instance.

Fixed-term elections will hinder the ability for a government to call it in the interest of the nation.

In the end, Borg’s proposal raises an important question: is this about genuine institutional improvement, or about political optics? Stability is not achieved by fixing dates on a calendar. It is built through consistent leadership, credible policy, and public trust.

Government prerogative vs Opposition pressure

While speculation about a possible early election exists, much of it stems from political interpretation rather than formal government action. The PN has suggested that internal events within the Labour Party, such as a national congress, are signals of electoral preparation. 

Ultimately, however, the power to call an election rests with the Prime Minister, not the Opposition. The government may choose to seek a fresh mandate early, but it is under no obligation to do so.

This is where the PN’s narrative becomes problematic. By implying that the country is being held hostage by the government in terms of uncertainty, it overlooks a key fact: the timeline is entirely within constitutional norms. And the only party creating uncertainty is the very PN in Opposition itself.